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Abstract: Information theory provides a mathematical foundation to measure uncertainty in belief.
Belief is represented by a probability distribution that captures our understanding of an outcome’s
plausibility. Information measures based on Shannon’s concept of entropy include realization information,
Kullback-Leibler divergence, Lindley’s information in experiment, cross entropy, and mutual information.
We derive a general theory of information from first principles that accounts for evolving belief
and recovers all of these measures. Rather than simply gauging uncertainty, information is understood in
this theory to measure change in belief. We may then regard entropy as the information we expect to
gain upon realization of a discrete latent random variable.
This theory of information is compatible with the Bayesian paradigm in which rational belief is
updated as evidence becomes available. Furthermore, this theory admits novel measures of information
with well-defined properties, which we explore in both analysis and experiment. This view of
information illuminates the study of machine learning by allowing us to quantify information captured
by a predictive model and distinguish it from residual information contained in training data. We gain
related insights regarding feature selection, anomaly detection, and novel Bayesian approaches.
Keywords: information, Bayesian inference, entropy, self information, mutual information,
Kullback-Leibler divergence, Lindley information, maximal uncertainty, proper utility
1. Introduction
This work integrates essential properties of information embedded within Shannon’s derivation of
entropy [1] and the Bayesian perspective [2–4], which identifies probability with plausibility. We pursue
this investigation in order to understand how to rigorously apply information-theoretic concepts to the
theory of inference and machine learning. Specifically, we would like to understand how to quantify the
evolution of predictions given by machine learning models. Our findings are general, however, and bear
implications for any situation in which states of belief are updated. We begin in 1.1 with an experiment
that illustrates shortcomings with the way standard information measures would partition prediction
information and residual information during machine learning training.
1.1. Shortcomings with standard approaches
Let us examine a typical MNIST [5] classifier. This dataset comprises a set of images of handwritten
digits paired with labels. Let both x and y denote random variables corresponding respectively to an image
and a label in a pair. In this perspective, the training dataset contains independent realizations of such
pairs from an unknown joint probability distribution. We would like to obtain a measurement of prediction
information that quantifies a shift in belief from an uninformed initial state q0(y) to model predictions
q1(y | x). The symmetric uninformed choice for q0(y) is uniform probability over all outcomes. Note that
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both q0(y) and q1(y | x) are simply hypothetical states of belief. Some architectures may approximate
Bayesian inference, but we cannot always interpret these as the Bayesian prior and posterior.
Two measurements that are closely related to Shannon’s entropy are the Kullback-Leibler
divergence [6,7] and Lindley’s information in experiment [8], which are computed respectively as
DKL[ q1(y | x) ‖ q0(y) ] =
∫
dy q1(y | x) log
(
q1(y | x)
q0(y)
)
and
DL[ q1(y | x) ‖ q0(y) ] =
∫
dy q1(y | x) log(q1(y | x))−
∫
dy q0(y) log(q0(y)) .
Whatever we choose, we would like to use a consistent construction to understand how much
information remains unpredicted. After viewing a label outcome yˇ, we let r(y | yˇ) represent our new
understanding of the actual state of affairs, which is a realization assigning full probability to the specified
outcome. This distribution captures our most updated knowledge about y and therefore constitutes
rational belief. A consistent information measurement should then quantify residual information as the
shift in belief from q1(y | x) to r(y | yˇ). For example, the KL version would be DKL[ r(y | yˇ) ‖ q1(y | x) ].
In order to demonstrate shortcomings with each approach, some cases are deliberately mislabeled
during model testing. We first compute information measurements assuming the incorrect labels hold.
Mislabled cases are then corrected to yˆ with corrected belief given by r(y | yˆ). This allows us to compare
our first information measurements with corrected versions. An example of each belief state is shown in
Figure 1 where the incorrect label 3 is changed to 0.
Digit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
q0(y) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
q1(y | x) 0.952 0.0 0.045 0.001 0.0 0.001 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.002
r(y | yˇ) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
r(y | yˆ) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Figure 1. Example of the evolution of plausible labels for an image. Without evidence, the probability
distribution q0(y) assigns equal plausibility to all outcomes. A machine learning model processes the
image and produces predictions q1(y | x). The incorrect label 3 is represented by r(y | yˇ). After observing
the image, shown on the right, the label is corrected to 0 in r(y | yˆ).
Ideally, the sum of prediction information and residual information would be a conserved quantity,
which would allow us to understand training as simply shifting information from a residual partition
to the predicted partition. More importantly, however, prediction information should clearly capture
prediction quality. Figure 2 shows information measurements corresponding to the example given.
Original Label Corrected Label
Information Type Prediction Residual Sum Prediction Residual Sum
Kullback-Leibler 3.02 10.44 13.46 3.02 0.07 3.09
Lindley 3.02 0.30 3.32 3.02 0.30 3.32
Figure 2. Information measurements before and after label correction. Neither construction of prediction
information allows the computation to account for claimed labels. Residual information, however, decreases
in the KL construction when the label is corrected. The Lindley forms are totally unaffected by relabeling.
Mislabeling and relabeling shows us that neither formulation of prediction information captures
prediction quality. This is because these constructions simply have no affordance to account for our
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understanding of what is actually correct. Large KL residual information offers some indication of
mislabeling and decreases when we correct the label, but total information is not conserved. As such,
there is no intuitive notion for what appropriate prediction and residual information should be for a given
problem. The Lindley formulation is substantially less satisfying; Although total information is conserved,
neither metric changes and we have no indication of mislabeling.
The problem with these constructions is they do not recognize the gravity of the role of expectation.
That is, reasonable expectation must be consistent with rational belief. We hold that our most justified
understanding of what may be true provides a sound basis to measure changes in belief. Figure 3 gives a
preview of information measurements in the framework of this theory. Total information, log2(10) bits
in this case, is conserved and both prediction information and residual information react intuitively to
mislabeling. Determining whether the predictive information is positive or negative provides a clear
indication of whether the prediction was informative.
Original Label Corrected Label
Information Type Prediction Residual Sum Prediction Residual Sum
Proposed -7.11 10.44 3.32 3.25 0.07 3.32
Figure 3. Information measurements using our proposed framework. Total information is a conserved
quantity and when our belief changes, so do the information measurements. Negative prediction
information forewarns either potential mislabeling or a poor prediction.
1.2. Our contributions
In the course of pursuing a consistent framework in which information measurements may be
understood, we have derived a theory of information from first principles that places all entropic
information measures in a unified interpretable context. By axiomatizing the properties of information
we desire, we show that a unique formulation follows that subsumes critical properties of Shannon’s
construction of entropy.
This theory fundamentally understands entropic information as a form of reasonable expectation
that measures the change between hypothetical belief states. Expectation is not necessarily taken with
respect to the distributions that represent the shift in belief, but rather with respect to a third distribution
representing our understanding of what may actually be true. We find compelling foundations for
this perspective within the Bayesian philosophy of probability as an extended logic for expressing and
updating uncertainty [4,9]. Our understanding of what may be true, and therefore the basis for measuring
information, should be rational belief. Rational belief [10–14] begins with probabilistically coherent
prior knowledge and is subsequently updated to account for observations using Bayes’ theorem. As a
consequence, information associated with a change in belief is not a fixed quantity. Just as rational belief
must evolve as new evidence becomes available, so also does the information we would reasonably assign
to previous shifts in belief. By emphasizing the role of rational belief, this theory recognizes that the degree
of validity we assign to past states of belief is both dynamic and potentially subjective as our state of
knowledge matures.
As a consequence of enforcing consistency with rational belief, a second additivity property emerges;
just as entropy can be summed over independent distributions, information gained over a sequence of
observations can be summed over intermediate belief updates. Total information over such a sequence
is independent of how results are grouped or ordered. This provides a compelling solution to the
thought experiment above. Label information in training data is a conserved quantity and we motivate a
formulation of prediction information that is directly tied to prediction quality.
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Soofi, Ebrahimi, and others [15–18] identify key contributions to information theory in the decade
following Shannon’s paper that are intrinsically tied to entropy. These are the Kullback-Leibler divergence,
Lindley’s information in experiment, and Jaynes’ construction of entropy-maximizing distributions that are
consistent with specified expectations. We show how this theory recovers these measures of information
and admits new forms that may not have been previously associated with entropic information, such as the
log pointwise posterior predictive measure of model accuracy [19]. We also show how this theory admits
novel information-optimal probability distributions analogous to that of Jaynes’ maximum uncertainty.
Having a consistent interpretation of information illuminates how it may be applied and what properties
will hold in a given context. Moreover, this theoretical framework enables us to solve multiple challenges
in Bayesian learning. For example, one such challenge is understanding how efficiently a given model
incorporates new data. This theory provides bounds on the information gained by a model resulting from
inference and allows us to characterize the information provided by individual observations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses notation and background regarding
entropic information, Bayesian inference, and reasonable expectation. Section 3 contains postulates that
express properties of information we desire as well as the formulation of information that follows and
other related measures of information. Section 4 analyzes general consequences and properties of this
formulation. Section 5 discusses further implications with respect to Bayesian inference and machine
learning. Section 6 explores negative information with computational experiments that illustrate when it
occurs, how it may be understood, and why it is useful. Section 7 summarizes these results and offers a
brief discussion of future work. Appendix A proves our principal result. Appendix B contains all corollary
proofs. Appendix C provides key computations used in experiments.
2. Background and notation
Shannon’s construction of entropy [1] shares a fundamental connection with thermodynamics. The
motivation is to facilitate analysis of complex systems which can be decomposed into independent
subsystems. The essential idea is simple — when probabilities multiply, entropy adds. This abstraction
allows us to compose uncertainties across independent sources by simply adding results. Shannon
applied this perspective to streams of symbols called channels. The number of possible outcomes grows
exponentially with the length of a symbol sequence, whereas entropy grows linearly. This facilitates
a rigorous formulation of the rate of information conveyed by a channel as well as analysis of what is
possible in the presence of noise.
The property of independent additivity is used in standard training practices for machine learning.
Just as thermodynamic systems and streams of symbols break apart, so does an ensemble of predictions
over independent observations. This allows us to partition training sets into batches and compute
cross-entropy [20] averages. MacKay [21] gives a comprehensive discussion of information in the context
of learning algorithms. Tishby [22] examines information trends during neural network training.
A second critical property of entropy, which is implied by Shannon and further articulated by both
Barnard [23] and Rényi [24], is that entropy is an expectation. Given a latent random variable z, we denote
the probability distribution over outcomes as p(z). Stated as an expectation, entropy is defined as
S[ p(z) ] =
∫
dz p(z) log
(
1
p(z)
)
= Ep(z) log
(
1
p(z)
)
.
Following Shannon, investigators developed a progression of divergence measures between general
probability distributions, q0(z) and q1(z). Notable cases include the Kullback-Leibler divergence, Rényi’s
information of order-α [24], and Csiszár’s f -divergence [25]. Ebrahimi, Soofi, and Soyer [18] offer an
examination of these axiomatic foundations and generalizations with a primary focus on entropy and the
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KL divergence. Recent work on axiomatic foundations for generalized entropies [26] includes constructions
that are suitable for strongly-interacting systems [27] and axiomatic derivations of other forms of entropy
including Sharma–Mittal and Frank–Daffertshofer entropies [28]. Further work relates group-theoretic
properties of systems to corresponding notions of entropy and correlation laws [29].
2.1. Bayesian reasoning
The Bayesian view of probability, going back to Laplace [2] and championed by Jeffreys [3] and
Jaynes [4], focuses on capturing our beliefs. This perspective considers a probability distribution as an
abstraction that attempts to model these beliefs. This view subsumes all potential sources of uncertainty
and provides a comprehensive scope that facilitates analysis in diverse contexts.
In the Bayesian framework, the prior distribution p(z) expresses initial beliefs about some latent
variable z. Statisticians, scientists, and engineers often have well-founded views about real-world systems
that from the basis for priors. Examples include physically realistic ranges of model parameters or plausible
responses of a dynamical system. In the case of total ignorance, one applies the principle of insufficient
reason [30] — we should not break symmetries of belief without justification. Jaynes’ construction of
maximally uncertainty distributions [31] generalizes this principle, which we discuss further in 4.6.
As observations x become available, we update belief from the prior distribution to obtain the posterior
distribution p(z | x), which incorporates this new knowledge. This update is achieved by applying Bayes’
theorem
p(z | x) = p(x | z)p(z)
p(x)
where p(x) =
∫
dz p(x | z)p(z).
The likelihood distribution p(x | z) expresses the probability of observations given any specified value of
z. The normalization constant p(x) is also the probability of x given the prior belief that has been specified.
Within Bayesian inference, this is also called model evidence and it is used to evaluate a model structure’s
plausibility for generating the observations.
Shore and Johnson [32,33] provide an axiomatic foundation for updating belief that recovers the
principles of maximum entropy and minimum cross-entropy when prior evidence consists of known
expectations. For reference, we summarize these axioms as
1. Uniqueness. When belief is updated with new observations, the result should be unique.
2. Coordinate invariance. Belief updates should be invariant to arbitrary choices of coordinates.
3. System independence. The theory should yield consistent results when independent random variables
are treated either separately or jointly.
4. Subset independence. When we partion potential outcomes into disjoint subsets, the belief update
corresponding to conditioning on subset membership first should yield the same result as updating
first and conditioning on the subset second.
Jizba and Korbel [34] investigate generalizations of entropy for which the maximum entropy principle
satisfies these axioms.
Integrating the maturing notion of belief found within the Bayesian framework with information
theory recognizes that our perception of how informative observations are depends on how our beliefs
develop, which is dynamic as our state of knowledge grows.
2.2. Probability notation
Random variables are denoted in boldface such as x. Typically x and y will imply observable
measurements and z will indicate either a latent explanatory variable or unknown observable. Each
random variable is implicitly associated with a corresponding probability space including the set of all
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possible outcomes Ωz, a σ-algebra Fz of measurable subsets, and a probability measure Pz which maps
subsets of events to probabilities. We then express the probability measure as a distribution function p(z).
A realization, or specific outcome, will be denoted with either a check zˇ or, for discrete distributions
only, a subscript zi where i ∈ [n] and [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. If it is necessary to emphasize the value of a
distribution at a specific point or realization, we will use the notation p(z = zˇ). Conditional dependence
is denoted in the usual fashion as p(z | x). The joint distribution is then p(x, z) = p(z | x)p(x) and
marginalization is obtained by p(x) =
∫
dz p(x, z). When two distributions are equivalent over all subsets
of nonzero measure, we use notation q0(z) ≡ p(z) or q1(z) ≡ p(z | x).
The probability measure allows us to compute expectations over functions f (z) which are denoted
Ep(z) f (z) =
∫
dz p(z) f (z).
The support of integration or summation is implied to be the same as the support of p(z), that is the set of
outcomes for which p(z) > 0. For example, in both the discrete case above and continuous cases, such as
a distribution on the unit interval z ∈ R[0,1], the integral notation should be interpreted respectively as
∫
dz p(z) f (z) =
n
∑
i=1
p(z = zi) f (zi) and
∫
dz p(z) f (z) =
∫ 1
0
dzˇ p(z = zˇ) f (zˇ).
2.3. Reasonable expectation and rational belief
The postulates and theory in this work concern the measurement of a shift in belief from an initial
state q0(z) to an updated state q1(z). In principle, these are any hypothetical states of belief. For example,
they could be predictions given by the computational model in 1.1, previous beliefs held before observing
additional data, or convenient approximations of a more informed state of belief. A third state r(z), rational
belief, serves a distinct role as the distribution over which expectation is taken. When we wish to emphasize
this role, we also refer to r(z) as the view of expectation.
To understand the significance of rational belief, we briefly review work by Cox [9] regarding
reasonable expectation from two perspectives on the meaning of probability. The first perspective
understands probability as a description of relative frequencies in an ensemble. If we prepare a large
ensemble of independent random variables, Z = {zi | i ∈ [n]}, and each is realized from a proper
(normalized) probability distribution p(z), then the relative frequency of outcomes within each subset
ω ∈ Ωz will approach the probability measure Pz(ω) for large n. It follows that the ensemble mean of any
transformation f (z) will approach the expectation
lim
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
i=1
f (zi) = Ep(z) f (z).
The difficulty arises when we distinguish what is true from what may be known, given limited evidence.
This falls within the purview of the second perspective, the Bayesian view, regarding probability as an
extended logic. To illustrate, suppose z is the value of an unknown real mathematical constant. The true
probability distribution would be a Dirac delta p(z) ≡ δ(z− zˇ) assigning unit probability to the unknown
value zˇ. Accordingly, each element in the ensemble above would take the same unknown value. If we
have incomplete knowledge r(z) regarding the distribution of plausible values, then we can still compute
an expectation Er(z) f (z), but we must bear in mind that the result only approximates the unknown true
expectation. Since the expectation is limited by the credibility of r(z), we seek to drive belief towards the
truth as efficiently as possible from available evidence to fulfill this role.
7 of 34
Within Bayesian Epistemology, rational belief is defined as a belief that is unsusceptible to a Dutch
Book. When an agent’s beliefs correspond to their willingness to places bets, a Dutch Book [11–14,35]
means that it is possible for a bookie to construct a table of bets that the agent finds acceptable but also
guarantees that the agent will lose money. Therefore the existence of such a table corresponds to the agent
holding an irrational state of belief. When multiple bets are allowed to be conditioned on a sequence of
outcomes, it has been shown that the agent must use Bayes’ Theorem to account for previous outcomes in
the sequence to update beliefs regarding subsequent outcomes to avoid irrationality [14].
For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that if we have a coherent prior belief in a latent variable as well
as a likelihood function that implies beliefs about observations, Bayes’ theorem incorporates observational
evidence to from the posterior distribution representing rational belief. For example, we could measure
inference information from prior belief q0(z) ≡ p(z) to the first posterior q1(z) ≡ p(z | x) conditioned
on an observation x. When we have additional evidence y that complements x, then rational belief must
corresponds to a second inference r(z) ≡ p(z | x, y) because retaining the belief q1(z) would not account
for y. Likewise, if z is an observable realization, then rational belief must assign full probability to the
observed outcome zˇ. This case is specifically denoted as r(z | zˇ) and in continuous settings it is equivalent
to the Dirac delta function r(z | zˇ) ≡ δ(z− zˇ).
2.4. Remarks on Bayesian objectivism and subjectivism
Within the Bayesian philosophy, we may disagree about whether or not rational belief is unique. This
disagreement corresponds to objectivist versus subjectivist views of Bayesian epistemology, see [4,36]
for a discussion. Note that this is not the same as the more general view of objective versus subjective
probabilities.
In the objectivist’s view, one’s beliefs must be consistent with the entirety of evidence and prior
knowledge must be justified by sound principles of reason. Therefore, anyone with the same body of
evidence must hold the same rational belief. In contrast, the subjectivist holds that one’s prior beliefs
do not need justification. Provided evidence is taken into account using Bayes’ theorem, the resulting
posterior is rational for any prior as long as the prior is coherent. Note that the subjectivist view does not
imply that all beliefs are equally valid. It simply allows validity in the construction of prior belief to be
derived from other notions of utility, such as computational feasibility.
While the following postulates in 3 and derivation of Theorem 1 do not require adoption of either
perspective, these philosophies influence how we understand reasonable expectation. The objective
philosophy implies that an information measurement is justified to the same degree as the view of
expectation that defines it, whereas the subjective philosophy entertains information analysis with any
view of expectation.
3. Information and evolution of belief
In order to provide context for comparison, we begin by presenting the properties of entropic
information originally put forward by Shannon using our notation.
3.1. Shannon’s properties of entropy
1. Given a discrete probability distribution p(z) for which z ∈ {zi | i ∈ [n]}, the entropy S[ p(z) ] is
continuous in the probability of each outcome p(z = zi).
2. If all outcomes are equally probable, namely p(z = zi) = 1/n, then S[ p(z) ] is monotonically
increasing in n.
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3. The entropy of a joint random variable S[ p(z,w) ] can be decomposed using a chain rule expressing
conditional dependence
S[ p(z,w) ] = S[ p(z) ] +Ep(z) S[ p(w | z) ] .
The first point is aimed at extending Shannon’s derivation, which employs rational probabilities, to
real-valued probabilities. The second point drives at understanding entropy as a measure of uncertainty;
as the number of possible outcomes increases, each realization becomes less predictable. This results in
entropy taking positive values. The third point is critical — not only does it encode independent additivity,
it implies that entropic information is computed as an expectation.
We note that Fadeeve [37] gives a simplified set of postulates. Rènyi [24] generalizes information
by replacing the last point with a weaker version which simply requires independent additivity, but not
conditional expectation. This results in α-divergences. Csiszàr [25] generalizes this further using convex
functions f to obtain f -divergences.
3.2. Postulates
Rather than repeating direct analogs of Shannon’s properties in the context of evolving belief, it is
both simpler and more illuminating to be immediately forthcoming regarding the key requirement of
information in the perspective of this theory.
Postulate 1. Entropic information associated with the change in belief from q0(z) to q1(z) is quantified as an
expectation over belief r(z), which we call the view of expectation. As an expectation, it must have the functional
form
Ir(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] =
∫
dz r(z) f (r(z), q1(z), q0(z)) .
Postulate 2. Entropic information is additive over independent belief processes. Taking joint distributions associated
with two independent random variables z and w to be q0(z,w) = q0(z)q0(w), q1(z,w) = q1(z)q1(w), and
r(z,w) = r(z)r(w) gives
Ir(z)r(w)[ q1(z)q1(w) ‖ q0(z)q0(w) ] = Ir(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] + Ir(w)[ q1(w) ‖ q0(w) ] .
Postulate 3. If belief does not change then no information is gained, regardless of the view of expectation,
Ir(z)[ q0(z) ‖ q0(z) ] = 0.
Postulate 4. The information gained from any normalized prior state of belief q0(z) to an updated state of belief
r(z) in the view of r(z) must be nonnegative
Ir(z)[ r(z) ‖ q0(z) ] ≥ 0.
The first postulate requires information to be reassessed as belief changes. The most justified state
of belief, based on the entirety of observations, will correspond to the most justified view of information.
The second postulate is the additive form of Shore and Johnson’s Axiom 3, system independence. That is,
we need some law of composition, addition in this case, that allows independent random variables to be
treated separately and arrive at the same result as treating them jointly.
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By combining the first two postulates, it is possible to show that f (r, q, p) = log
(
rγqαpβ
)
for constants
α, β,γ. See A for details. The third postulate constrains these exponential constants and the fourth simply
sets the sign of information.
3.3. Principal result
Theorem 1. Information as a measure of change in belief. Information measurements that satisfy these
postulates must take the form
Ir(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] = α
∫
dz r(z) log
(
q1(z)
q0(z)
)
for some α > 0.
Proof is given in A. As Shannon notes regarding entropy, α corresponds to a choice of units. Typical
choices are natural units α = 1 and bits α = log(2)−1. We employ natural units in analysis and bits in
experiments.
Although it would be possible to combine Postulate 1 and Postulate 2 into an analog of Shannon’s
chain rule as a single postulate, doing so would obscure the reasoning behind the construction. We leave
the analogous chain rule as a consequence in Corollary 1. Regarding Shannon’s proof that entropy is
the only construction that satisfies properties he provides, we observe that he has restricted attention to
functionals acting upon a single distribution. The interpretation of entropy is discussed in 4.1.
Normalization of r(z) is a key property of rational belief and reasonable expectation. As for q0(z) and
q1(z), however, nothing postulated prevents analysis respecting improper or non-normalizable probability
distributions. In the Bayesian context, such distributions merely represent relative plausibility among
subsets of outcomes. We caution that such analysis is a further abstraction, which requires additional care
for consistent interpretation.
We remark that although Rènyi and Csiszàr were able to generalize divergence measures by
weakening Shannon’s chain rule to independent additivity, inclusion of the first postulate prevents such
generalizations. We suspect, however, that if we replace Postulate 1 with an alternative functional that
incorporates rational belief into information measurements, or we replace Postulate 2 with an alternative
formulation of system independence, then other compelling information theories would follow.
3.4. Regarding the support of expectation
The proof given assumes q0(z) and q1(z) take positive values over the support of the integral, which
is also the support of r(z). In the Bayesian context, we also have
q1(z) =
p(x | z)q0(z)
p(x)
and r(z) =
p(y | z, x)q1(z)
p(y | x)
Accordingly, if for some zˇ we have q1(zˇ) = 0 it follows that r(zˇ) = 0. Likewise, q0(zˇ) = 0 would imply
both q1(zˇ) = 0 and r(zˇ) = 0. This forbids information contributions that fall beyond the scope of the
proof. Even so, the resulting form is analytic and admits analytic continuation.
Since both limε→0 [ε log ε] = 0 and limε→0
[
ε log ε−1
]
= 0, limits of information of the form
lim
ε→0
ε log
(
q1
q0
)
, lim
ε→0
ε log
( q1
ε
)
, lim
ε→0
ε log
(
ε
q0
)
, and lim
ε→0
ε log
( ε
ε
)
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are consistent with restricting the domain of integration (or summation) to the support of r(z). We gain
further insight by considering limits of the form
lim
ε→0
r log
(
ε
q
)
and lim
ε→0
r log
( q
ε
)
.
Information diverges to −∞ in the first case and +∞ in the second. This is consistent with the fact that no
finite amount of data will recover belief over a subset that has been strictly forbidden from consideration,
which bears ramifications for how we understand rational belief.
If belief is not subject to influence from evidence, it is difficult to credibly construe an inferred outcome
as having rationally accounted for that evidence. Lindley calls this Cromwell’s rule [38]; we should not
eliminate a potential outcome from consideration unless it is logically false. The principle of insufficient
reason goes further by avoiding unjustified creation of information that is not influenced by evidence.
3.5. Information density
The Radon-Nikodym theorem [39] formalizes the notion of density that relates two measures. If we
assign both probability and a second measure to any subset within a probability space, then there exists a
density function, unique up to subsets of measure zero, such that the second measure is equivalent to the
integral of said density over any subset.
Definition 1. Information density. We take the Radon-Nikodym derivative to obtain information density of the
change in belief from q0(z) to q1(z)
D[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] =
dIr(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ]
dr(z)
= log
(
q1(z)
q0(z)
)
.
The key property we find in this construction is independence from the view of expectation. As
such, information density encodes all potential information outcomes one could obtain from this theory.
Furthermore, this formulation is amenable to analysis of improper distributions. For example, it proves
useful to consider information density corresponding to constant unit probability density q1(z) ≡ 1,
which is discussed further in 4.1.
3.6. Information pseudometrics
The following pseudometrics admit interpretations as notions of distance between belief states that
remain compatible with Postulate 1. This is achieved by simply taking the view of expectation r(z) to be
the weight function in weighted-Lp norms of information density. These constructions then satisfy useful
properties of pseudometrics:
1. Positivity, Lpr(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] ≥ 0,
2. Symmetry, Lpr(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] = L
p
r(z)[ q0(z) ‖ q1(z) ],
3. Triangle inequality,
Lpr(z)[ q2(z) ‖ q0(z) ] ≤ L
p
r(z)[ q2(z) ‖ q1(z) ] +L
p
r(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] .
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Definition 2. Lp information pseudometrics. We may construct pseudometrics that measure distance between
states of belief q0(z) and q1(z) with the view of expectation r(z), by taking weighted-Lp norms of information
density where the view of expectation serves as the weight function
Lpr(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] =
(∫
dz r(z)
∣∣∣∣log(q1(z)q0(z)
)∣∣∣∣p)1/p for some p ≥ 1.
Note that taking p = 1 results in a pseudometric that is also a pure expectation. The homogeneity
property of seminorms, ‖αx‖ = |α|‖x‖ for α ∈ R, implies that these constructions retain the units of
measure of information density; if information density is measured in bits, these distances have units
of bits as well. Symmetry is obvious from inspection and the other properties follow by construction as
seminorms. Specifically, positivity follows from the fact that | · |p is a convex function for p ≥ 1. The lower
bound immediately follows from Jensen’s inequality
Lpr(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] ≥
∣∣∣Ir(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ]∣∣∣ ≥ 0.
A short proof of the triangle inequality is given in B.
We observe that if q0(z) and q1(z) are measurably distinct over the support of r(z) then the measured
distance must be greater than zero. We may regard states of belief q0(z) and q1(z) as weakly equivalent
in the view of r(z) if their difference is immeasurable over the support of r(z). That is, if q0(z) and q1(z)
only differ over subsets of outcomes that are deemed by r(z) to be beyond plausible consideration, then
in the view of r(z) they are equivalent. As such, these pseudometrics could be regarded as subjective
metrics in the view of r(z). The natural definition of information variance also satisfies the properties of a
pseudometric and is easily interpreted as a standard statistical construct.
Definition 3. Information variance. Information variance between belief states q0(z) and q1(z) in the view of
expectation r(z) is simply the variance of information density
Varr(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] =
∫
dz r(z)
(
log
(
q1(z)
q0(z)
)
− ϕ
)2
where ϕ = Ir(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ].
4. Corollaries and Interpretations
The following corollaries examine primary consequences of Theorem 1. Note that multiple random
variables may be expressed as a single joint variable such as z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn). The following corollaries
explore one or two components at a time such as variables z1 and z2 or observations x and y. Extensions
to multiple random variables easily follow.
Note that the standard formulation of conditional dependence holds for all probability distributions
in Corollary 1. That is, given an arbitrary joint distribution q(z1, z2), we can compute the marginalization
as q(z1) ≡
∫
dz2 q(z1, z2) and conditional dependence follows by the Radon-Nikodym derivative to obtain
q(z2 | z1) ≡ q(z1,z2)q(z1) . All proofs are contained in B.
Corollary 1. Chain rule of conditional dependence. Information associated with joint variables decomposes as
Ir(z1,z2)[ q1(z1, z2) ‖ q0(z1, z2) ] = Ir(z1)[ q1(z1) ‖ q0(z1) ]
+Er(z1) Ir(z2 | z1)[ q1(z2 | z1) ‖ q0(z2 | z1) ] .
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Corollary 2. Additivity over belief sequences. Information gained over a sequence of belief updates is additive
within the same view. Given initial belief q0(z), intermediate states q1(z) and q2(z), and the view r(z) we have
Ir(z)[ q2(z) ‖ q0(z) ] = Ir(z)[ q2(z) ‖ q1(z) ] + Ir(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] .
Corollary 3. Antisymmetry. Information from q1(z) to q0(z) is the negative of information from q0(z) to q1(z)
Ir(z)[ q0(z) ‖ q1(z) ] = −Ir(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] .
4.1. Entropy
Shannon’s formalization of entropy as uncertainty may be consistently understood as the expectation
of information gained by realization. We first reconstruct information contained in realization. We then
define the general form of entropy in the discrete case, which is cross entropy, and finally the standard
form of entropy follows.
Corollary 4. Realization information (discrete). Let z be a discrete random variable z ∈ {zi | i ∈ [n]}.
Information gained by realization zˇ from q(z) in the view of realization r(z | zˇ) is
Ir(z | zˇ)[ r(z | zˇ) ‖ q(z) ] = D[ 1 ‖ q(z = zˇ) ] .
Corollary 5. Cross entropy (discrete). Let z be a discrete random variable z ∈ {zi | i ∈ [n]} and zˇ be a
hypothetical realization. Expectation over the view r(zˇ) of information gained by realization from belief q(z) recovers
cross entropy
Er(zˇ) Ir(z | zˇ)[ r(z | zˇ) ‖ q(z) ] = Ir(z)[ 1 ‖ q(z) ] = Sr(z)[ q(z) ] .
Corollary 6. Entropy (discrete). Let z be a discrete random variable z ∈ {zi | i ∈ [n]} and zˇ be a hypothetical
realization. Expectation over plausible realizations q(zˇ) of information gained by realization from belief q(z)
recovers entropy
Eq(zˇ) Ir(z | zˇ)[ 1 ‖ q(z) ] = Iq(z)[ 1 ‖ q(z) ] = S[ q(z) ] .
Shannon proved that this is the only construction as a functional acting on a single distribution
q(z) that satisfies his properties. As mentioned earlier, the information notation Iq(z)[ 1 ‖ q(z) ] requires
some subtlety of interpretation. Probability density 1 over all discrete outcomes z ∈ Ωz is not generally
normalized. Although these formulas are convenient abstractions that result from formal derivations as
expectations in the discrete case, nothing prevents us from applying them in continuous settings, which
recovers the typical definitions in such cases.
In the continuous setting, we must emphasize that this definition of entropy is not consistent with
taking the limit of a sequence of discrete distributions that converges in probability density to a continuous
limiting distribution. The entropy of such a sequence diverges to infinity, which matches our intuition; the
number of bits required to specify a continuous (real) random variable also diverges.
4.2. Information in an observation
As discussed in 2.3, we may regard q0(z) ≡ p(z) as prior belief and q1(z) ≡ p(z | x) as the posterior
conditioned on the observation of x. Without any additional evidence, we must hold r(z) ≡ p(z | x) to
be rational belief and we recover the Kullback-Liebler divergence as the rational measure of information
gained by the observation of x, but with a caveat; once we obtain additional evidence y then information
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in the observation of x must be recomputed as Ip(z | x,y)[ p(z | x) ‖ p(z) ]. In contrast, this theory holds that
Lindley’s corresponding measure
DL[ p(z | x) ‖ p(z) ] = S[ p(z) ]− S[ p(z | x) ]
is not the information gained by the observation of x; it is simply the difference in uncertainty before and
after the observation.
4.3. Potential information
We now consider expectations over hypothetical future observations w that would influence belief in
z as a latent variable. Given belief p(z), the probability of an observation w is p(w) =
∫
dz p(w | z)p(z) as
usual.
Corollary 7. Consistent future expectation. Let the view p(z) express present belief in the latent variable z and
w represent a future observation. The expectation over plausible w of information in the belief-shift from q0(z) to
q1(z) in the view of rational future belief p(z |w) is equal to information in the present view
Ep(w) Ip(z |w)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] = Ip(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] .
Corollary 8. Mutual information. Let the view p(z) express present belief in the latent variable z and w represent
a future observation. Expectation of information gained by a future observation w is mutual information
Ep(w) Ip(z |w)[ p(z |w) ‖ p(z) ] = Ip(z,w)[ p(z,w) ‖ p(z)p(w) ] .
Corollary 9. Realization limit. Let z be a latent variable and zˇ be the limit of increasing observations to obtain
arbitrary precision over plausible values of z. Information gained from q0(z) to q1(z) in the realization limit r(z | zˇ)
is pointwise information density
Ir(z | zˇ)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] = D[ q1(z = zˇ) ‖ q0(z = zˇ) ] .
4.4. Consistent optimization analysis
Bernardo [40] shows that integrating entropy-like information measures with Bayesian inference
provides a logical foundation for rational experimental design. He considers potential utility functions, or
objectives for optimization, which are formulated as kernels of expectation over posterior belief updated
by the outcome of an experiment. Bernardo then distinguishes the belief a scientist reports from belief that
is justified by inference.
For a utility function to be proper, the Bayesian posterior must be the unique optimizer of expected
utility over all potentially reported beliefs. In other words, a proper utility function must not provide an
incentive to lie. His analysis shows that Lindley information is a proper utility function. Corollary 10 holds
that information in this theory also provides proper utility. Thus information measures are not simply ad
hoc objectives; they facilitate consistent optimization-based analysis that recovers rational belief.
Corollary 10. Information is a proper utility function. Taking the rational view p(z | x) over the latent variable
z conditioned upon an experimental outcome x, the information Ip(z | x)[ q(z) ‖ p(z) ] from prior belief p(z) to
reported belief q(z) is a proper utility function. That is, the unique optimizer recovers rational belief
q∗(z) ≡ argmax
q(z)
Ip(z | x)[ q(z) ‖ p(z) ] ≡ p(z | x).
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We would like to go a step further and show that when information from q0(z) to q1(z) is positive
in the view of r(z), we may claim that q1(z) is closer to r(z) than q0(z). For this claim to be consistent
we must show that any perturbation that unambiguously drives belief q1(z) toward the view r(z) must
also increase information. The complementary perturbation response with respect to q0(z) immediately
follows by Corollary 3.
Corollary 11. Proper perturbation response. Let q1(z) be measurably distinct from the view r(z) and
Ir(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] be finite. Let the perturbation η(z) preserve normalization and drive belief toward r(z)
on all measurable subsets. It follows
lim
ε→0
∂
∂ε
Ir(z)[ q1(z) + εη(z) ‖ q0(z) ] > 0.
It bears repeating, by Corollary 8, that mutual information captures expected proper utility, which
provides a basis for rational experimental design and feature selection.
4.5. Discrepancy functions
Ebrahimi, Soofi, and Soyer [18] discuss information discrepancy functions, which have two key
properties. First, a discrepancy function is nonnegative D[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] ≥ 0 with equality if and only if
q1(z) ≡ q0(z). Second, if we hold q0(z) fixed thenD[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] is convex in q1(z). One of the reasons
information discrepancy functions are useful is that they serve to identify independence. Random variables
x and z are independent if and only if p(x) ≡ p(x | z). Therefore, we have D[ p(x, z) ‖ p(x)p(z) ] ≥ 0 with
equality if and only if x and z are independent, noting that p(x, z) ≡ p(x | z)p(z). This has implications
regarding sensible generalizations of mutual information.
Theorem 1 does not satisfy information discrepancy properties unless the view of expectation is taken
to be r(z) ≡ q1(z), which is the KL divergence. We note, however, that information pseudometrics and
information variance given in 3.6 satisfy a weakened formulation. Specifically, Lpr(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] ≥ 0
with equality if and only if q0(z) and q1(z) are weakly equivalent in the view of r(z). Likewise, these
formulations are convex in information density D[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ].
4.6. Jaynes maximal uncertainty
Jaynes uses entropy to analytically construct a unique probability distribution for which uncertainty
is maximal while maintaining consistency with a specified set of expectations. This construction avoids
unjustified creation of information and places the principle of insufficient reason into an analytic framework
within which the notion of symmetry generalizes to informational symmetries conditioned upon observed
expectations.
We review how Jaynes constructs the resulting distribution r∗(z). Let such kernels of expectation be
denoted fi(z) for i ∈ [n] and the observed expectations be Er(z)[ fi(z)] = ϕi. The objective of optimization
is
r∗(z) = argmax
r(z)
S[ r(z) ] subject to Er(z) fi(z) = ϕi ∀ i ∈ [n].
The Lagrangian, which captures both the uncertainty objective and expectation constraints, is
L[ r(z),λ ] =
∫
dz r(z)
(
log
(
1
r(z)
)
−
n
∑
i=1
λi ( fi(z)− ϕi)
)
.
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where λ ∈ Rn is the vector of Lagrange multipliers. This Lagrangian formulation satisfies the variational
principle in both r(z) and λ. Variational analysis yields the optimizer
r∗(z) ∝ exp
(
n
∑
i=1
λi fi(z)
)
.
4.6.1. Information-critical distributions
Rather than maximizing entropy, we may minimize Ir(z)[ r(z) ‖ q0(z) ] while maintaining consistency
with specified expectations. Since the following corollary holds for general distributions q0(z), including
the improper case q0(z) ≡ 1, this includes Jaynes’ maximal uncertainty as a minimization of negative
entropy.
Corollary 12. Minimal information. Given kernels of expectation fi(z) and specified expectationsEr(z)[ fi(z)] =
ϕi for i ∈ [n], the distribution r∗(z) that satisfies these constraints while minimizing information Ir(z)[ r(z) ‖ q0(z) ]
is given by
r∗(z) ∝ q0(z) exp
(
n
∑
i=1
λi fi(z)
)
for some λ ∈ Rn.
4.7. Remarks on Fisher information
Fisher provides an analytic framework to assess the suitability of a pointwise latent description of a
probability distribution [41]. As Kullback and Leibler note, the functional properties of information in
Fisher’s construction are quite different from Shannon’s and thus we do not regard Fisher information as a
form of entropic information. Fisher’s construction, however, can be rederived and understood within this
theory. He begins with the assumption that there is some latent realization zˇ for which p(x | zˇ) is an exact
description of the true distribution of x. We can then define the Fisher score as the gradient of information
from any independent prior belief q0(x) to a pointwise latent description p(x | z), in the view p(x | zˇ)
f = ∇zIp(x | zˇ)[ p(x | z) ‖ q0(x) ] .
Note that zˇ is fixed by assumption, despite remaining unknown. By the variational principle, the score
must vanish at the optimizer z∗. By Corollary 10, the optimizer must be z∗= zˇ. We can then assess the
sensitivity of information to the parameter z at the optimizer z∗by computing the Hessian. This recovers
an equivalent construction of the Fisher matrix within this theory
Fij =
∂2
∂zi∂zj
Ip(x | zˇ)[ p(x | z) ‖ q0(x) ] .
The primary idea behind this construction is that high-curvature in z implies that a pointwise description
is both suitable and a well-conditioned optimization problem.
4.7.1. Generalized Fisher matrix
We may eliminate the assumption of an exact pointwise description and generalize analogous
formulations to arbitrary views of expectation.
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Definition 4. Generalized Fisher score. Let r(x) be the view of expectation regarding an observable x. The
gradient with respect to z of information from independent prior belief q0(x) to a pointwise description p(x | z)
gives the score
f = ∇zIr(x)[ p(x | z) ‖ q0(x) ] .
Definition 5. Generalized Fisher matrix. Let r(x) be the view of expectation regarding an observable x. The
Hessian matrix with respect to components of z of information from independent prior belief q0(x) to the pointwise
description p(x | z) gives the generalized Fisher matrix
Fij =
∂2
∂zi∂zj
Ir(x)[ p(x | z) ‖ q0(x) ] .
Again, a local optimizer z∗ must satisfy the variational principle and yield a score of zero. The
generalized Fisher matrix would typically be evaluated at such an optimizer z∗.
5. Information in inference and machine learning
We now examine model information and predictive information provided by inference. Once we
have defined these information measurements, we derive upper and lower bounds between them that we
anticipate being useful for future work. Finally, we show how inference information may be constrained,
which addresses some challenges in Bayesian inference.
5.1. Machine learning information
Akaike [42] first introduced information-based complexity criteria as a strategy for model selection.
These ideas were further developed by Schwarz, Burnham, and Gelman [19,43,44]. We anticipate these
notions will prove useful in future work to both understand and control the problem of memorization
in machine learning training. Accordingly, we discuss how this theory views model complexity and
distinguishes formulations of predictive information and residual information.
In machine learning, observations correspond to matched pairs of inputs and labels Y ={(
x(j), y(j)
) ∣∣∣ j ∈ [T]}. For each sample j of T training examples, we would like to map the input x(j) to
an output label y(j). Latent variables θ are unknown model parameters from a specified model family
or computational structure. A model refers to a specific parameter state and the predictions that the
model computes are p(y(j) | x(j), θ). Since the definitions and derivations that follow hold with respect to
either single cases or the entire training ensemble, we will use shorthand notation p(y | θ) to refer to both
scenarios.
We denote the initial state of belief in model parameters as q0(θ) and updated belief during training
as qi(θ) for i ∈ [n]. We can then compute predictions from any state of model belief by marginalization
qi(y) ≡
∫
dθp(y | θ)qi(θ).
Definition 6. Model information. Model information from initial belief q0(θ) to updated belief qi(θ) in the view
of r(θ) is given by
Ir(θ)[ qi(θ) ‖ q0(θ) ] for i ∈ [n].
When we compute information contained in training labels, the label data obviously provide the
rational view. This is represented succinctly by r(y | yˇ), which assigns full probability to specified outcomes.
Again, if we need to be explicit then this could be written as r(y | x(j), y(j)) for each case in the training set.
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Definition 7. Predictive label information. The realization of training labels is the rational view r(y | yˇ) of label
plausibility. We compute information from prior predictive belief q0(y) to predictive belief qi(y) in this view as
Ir(y | yˇ)[ qi(y) ‖ q0(y) ] .
In the continuous setting, this formulation is closely related to log pointwise predictive density [19]. We
can also define complementary label information that is not contained in the predictive model.
Definition 8. Residual label information (discrete). Residual information in the label realization view r(y | yˇ)
is computed as
Ir(y | yˇ)[ r(y | yˇ) ‖ qi(y) ] .
Residual information is equivalent to cross-entropy if the labels are full realizations. We note, however,
that if training labels are probabilistic and leave some uncertainty then replacing both occurances of r(y | yˇ)
above with a general distribution r(y) would correctly calibrate residual information so that if predictions
were to match label distributions then residual information would be zero.
As a consequence of Corollary 2, the sum of predictive label information and residual label information
is always constant. This allows us to rigorously frame predictive label information as a fraction of the
total information contained in training labels. Moreover, Corollary 11 assures us that model perturbations
that drive predictive belief toward the label view must increase predictive information. In the continuous
setting, just as the limiting form of entropy discussed in 4.1 diverges, so also does residual information
diverge. Predictive label information, however, remains a finite alternative. This satisfies our initial
incentive for this investigation.
There is a second type of predictive information we may rationally construct, however. Rather than
considering predictive information with respect to specified label outcomes, we might be interested in the
information we expect to obtain about new samples from the generative process. If we regard marginalized
predictions qi(y) as our best approximation of this process, then we would simply measure change in
predictive belief in this view.
Definition 9. Predictive generative approximation. We may approximate the distribution of new outcomes
from model belief qi(θ) using the predictive marginalization qi(y) ≡
∫
dθp(y | θ)qi(θ). If we hold this to be the
rational view of new outcomes from the generative process, predictive information is
Iqi(y)[ qi(y) ‖ q0(y) ] .
5.2. Inference information bounds
In Bayesian inference, we have prior belief in model parameters q0(θ) ≡ p(θ) and the posterior
inferred from training data q1(θ) ≡ p(θ | yˇ). The predictive marginalizations are called the prior predictive
and posterior predictive distributions respectively
p(y) ≡
∫
dθp(y | θ)p(θ) and p(y | yˇ) ≡
∫
dθp(y | θ)p(θ | yˇ).
We derive inference information bounds for Bayesian networks [45]. Let y, θ1, and θ2 represent a
directed graph of latent variables. In general, the joint distribution can always be written as p(y, θ1, θ2) =
p(θ2 | θ1, y)p(θ1 | y)p(y). The property of local conditionality [46] means p(θ2 | θ1, yˇ) ≡ p(θ2 | θ1). That is,
belief dependence in θ2 is totally determined by that of θ1 just as belief in θ1 is computed from yˇ.
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Corollary 13. Joint local inference information. Inference information in θ1 gained by having observed yˇ is
equivalent to the inference information in both θ1 and θ2.
Ip(θ1,θ2 | yˇ)[ p(θ1, θ2 | yˇ) ‖ p(θ1, θ2) ] = Ip(θ1 | yˇ)[ p(θ1 | yˇ) ‖ p(θ1) ] .
Corollary 14. Monotonically decreasing local inference information. Inference information in θ2 gained by
having observed yˇ is bound above by inference information in θ1.
Ip(θ2 | yˇ)[ p(θ2 | yˇ) ‖ p(θ2) ] ≤ Ip(θ1 | yˇ)[ p(θ1 | yˇ) ‖ p(θ1) ] .
This shows that inference yields nonincreasing information as we compound inference on locally
conditioned latent variables, which is relevant for sequential predictive computational models such as
neural networks. We observe that the inference sequence from training data yˇ to model parameters θ to
new predictions y is also a locally conditioned sequence. If belief in a given latent variable is represented as
a probability distribution, this places bounds on what transformations are compatible with the progression
of information. For example, accuracy measures which snap the maximum probability outcome of a neural
network to unit probability impose an unjustified creation of information.
Corollary 15. Inferred information upper bound. Model information in the posterior view is less than or equal
to predictive label information resulting from inference
Ip(θ | yˇ)[ p(θ | yˇ) ‖ p(θ) ] ≤ Ir(y | yˇ)[ p(y | yˇ) ‖ p(y) ] .
This is noteworthy because it tells us that inference always yields a favorable tradeoff between
increased model complexity and predictive information. Combining Corollary 14 and Corollary 15, we
have upper and lower bounds on model information due to inference
Ip(y | yˇ)[ p(y | yˇ) ‖ p(y) ] ≤ Ip(θ | yˇ)[ p(θ | yˇ) ‖ p(θ) ] ≤ Ir(y | yˇ)[ p(y | yˇ) ‖ p(y) ] .
5.3. Inference information constraints
Practitioners of Bayesian inference often struggle when faced with inference problems for models
structures that are not well suited to the data. An under expressive model family is not capable of
representing the process being modeled. As a consequence, the posterior collapses to a small set of
outcomes that are least inconsistent with the evidence. In contrast, an over expressive model admits
multiple sufficient explanations of the process.
Both model and predictive information measures offer means to understand and address these
challenges. By constraining the information gained by inference, we may solve problems associated
with model complexity. In this section, we discuss explicit and implicit approaches to enforcing such
constraints.
5.3.1. Explicit information constraints
Our first approach to encode information constraints is to explicitly solve a distribution that satisfies
expected information gained from the prior to the posterior. We examine how information-critical
distributions can be constructed from arbitrary states of belief qi(θ) for i ∈ [n]. Again, we may obtain
critical distributions with respect to uncertainty by simply setting q0(θ) ≡ 1. By applying this to inference,
so that n = 1 and q1(θ) ≡ p(θ | y), we recover likelihood annealling as a means to control model
information.
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Corollary 16. Constrained information. Given states of belief qi(θ) and information constraints
Ir(θ)[ qi(θ) ‖ q0(θ) ] = ϕi for i ∈ [n], the distribution r∗(θ) that satisfies these constraints while minimizing
Ir(θ)[ r(θ) ‖ q0(θ) ] has the form
r∗(θ) ∝ q0(θ)
n
∏
i=1
(
qi(θ)
q0(θ)
)λi
for some λ ∈ Rn.
Corollary 17. Information-annealed inference. Annealed belief r(θ) for which information gained from prior
to posterior belief is fixed Ir(θ)[ p(θ | yˇ) ‖ p(θ) ] = ϕ and information Ir(θ)[ r(θ) ‖ p(θ) ] is minimal must take the
form
r(θ) ∝ p(yˇ | θ)λp(θ) for some λ ∈ R.
Note that the bounds in 5.2 still apply if we simply include λ as a fixed model parameter in the
definition of the likelihood function so that p(yˇ | θ) 7→ p(yˇ | θ,λ) ≡ p(yˇ | θ)λ. This prevents the model
from learning too much, which may be useful for under-expressive models or for smoothing out the
posterior distribution to aid exploration during learning.
5.3.2. Implicit information constraints
Our second approach introduces hyper-parameters, λ and ψ, into the Bayesian inference problem,
which allows us to define a prior on those hyper-parameters that implicitly encodes information constraints.
This approach gives us a way to express how much we believe we can learn from the data and model that
we have in hand. Doing so may prevent overconfidence when there are known modeling inadequacies or
underconfidence from overly broad priors.
As above, λ parameters influence the likelihood and can be though of as controlling annealing or
an embedded stochastic error model. The ψ parameters control the prior on the model parameters θ.
For example, these parameters could be the prior mean and co-variance if we assume a Gaussian prior
distribution. Therefore the inference problem takes the form
p(θ,λ,ψ | yˇ) = p(yˇ | θ,λ)p(θ |ψ)p(λ,ψ)
p(yˇ)
.
In order to encode the information constraints, we must construct the hyper-prior distribution
p(λ,ψ) = g
(
ϕθ , ϕy
)
where
ϕθ = Ip(θ | yˇ,λ,ψ)[ p(θ | yˇ,λ,ψ) ‖ p(θ |ψ) ] and
ϕy = Ir(y | yˇ)[ p(y | yˇ,λ,ψ) ‖ p(y | λ,ψ) ]
control model information and predictive information, respectively. The function g
(
ϕθ , ϕy
)
is the
likelihood of λ and ψ given the specified model and prediction complexities. For example, this could be
an indicator function as to whether the information gains are within some range. Note that we may also
consider other forms of predictive information such as the predictive generative approximation.
The posterior distribution on model parameters and posterior predictive distribution can be formed
by marginalizing over hyper-parameters
p(θ | yˇ) =
∫
dλdψ p(θ,λ,ψ | yˇ) and
p(y | yˇ) =
∫
dλdψ p(y | θ,λ)p(θ,λ,ψ | yˇ).
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6. Negative information
The possibility of negative information is a unique property of this theory in contrast to divergence
measures such as Kullback-Leibler divergence, α-divergences, and f -divergences. It provides an easily
interpreted notion of whether a belief update is consistent with our best understanding. Negative
information can be consistently associated with misinformation in the view of rational belief. That is,
if Ir(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] is negative then q0(z) is a better approximation of rational belief than q1(z). The
consistency of this interpretation would be violated if we could construct q1(z) that is unambigously
better than q0(z) at approximating r(z). Corollary 11 shows, however, that this is not possible. If we
construct q1(z) by integrating perturbations from q0(z) that drive belief towards r(z) on all measurable
subsets, then information must be positive. The following experiments illustrate examples of negative
information and motivate its utility.
6.1. Negative information in continuous inference
In the following set of experiments we have a latent variable θ ∈ R2, which is distributed as
N (θ | 0, I). Each sample y(j) ∈ R2 corresponds to realization of an independent latent variable x(j) ∈ R2
so that y(j) = θ+ x(j). Each x(j) is distributed as N (x(j) | 0, σ21 I) where σ1 = 1/2. Both prior belief in
plausible values of θ and prior predictive belief in plausible values of y are visualized in Figure 4. Deciles
separate annuli of probability 1/10. The model information we expect to gain by observing 10 samples of
y, which is also mutual information from Corollary 8, is Ip(y,θ)[ p(y, θ) ‖ p(y)p(θ) ] = 5.36 bits. See C for
details.
The first observation consists of 10 samples of y followed by inference of θ. Subsequent observations
each add another 10, 20, and 40 samples respectively. A typical inference sequence is shown in Figure 5.
Model information gained by inference from the first observation in the same view is 5.72 bits. As
additional observations become available the model information provided by first inference is eventually
refined to 5.10 bits. Typically the region of plausible models θ resulting from each inference is consistent
with what was previously considered plausible.
By running 1 million independent experiments, we construct a histogram of the model information
provided by first inference in subsequent views. This is shown in Figure 6. As a consequence of
Postulate 4, the model information provided by first inference must always be positive before any
additional observations are made. The change in model covariance in this experiment provides a stronger
lower bound of 3.95 bits after first inference, which can be seen in the first view on the left. This bound is
Figure 4. Prior distribution of θ and prior predictive distribution of individual y samples. The domain of
plausible θ values is large before any observations are made.
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Figure 5. Typical inference of θ from observation of 10 samples of y (left) followed by 10, 20, and 40
additional samples respectively. Both prior belief and first inference deciles of θ are shown in gray. As
observations accumulate, the domain of plausible θ values tightens.
Figure 6. Histogram of first inference information in observation sequence. The vertical line at 5.36 bits is
mutual information. Information is positive after first inference, but may drop with additional observations.
The limiting view of infinite samples (realization) is shown on the right.
saturated in the limit when the inferred mean is unchanged. Additional observations may indicate that the
first inference was less informative than initially believed. We may regard the rare cases showing negative
information as being misinformed after first inference. The true value of the model θ may be known to
arbitrary precision if we collect enough observations. This is the realization limit on the right. Under
this experimental design, this limit converges to the Laplace distribution centered at mutual information
L(µ, (log 2)−1) computed in the prior view.
From these million experiments, we can select the most unusual cases for which the information
provided by first inference is later found to an extreme. Figure 7 visualizes the experiment for which the
information provided by first inference is found to be the minimum after observing 160 total samples from
the generative process. Although model information assessed following the first observation is a fairly
typical value, additional samples quickly show that the first samples were unusual. This becomes highly
apparent in the fourth view, which includes 80 samples in total.
Figure 8 visualizes the complementary case in which we select the experiment for which the
information provided by first inference is later found to be the maximum. The explantory characteristic
of this experiment is the rare value that the true model has taken. High information in inference shows
a high degree of surprise from what the prior distribution deemed plausible. Each inference indicates a
range of plausible values of θ that is quite distant from the plausible region indicated by prior belief. The
change in belief due to first inference is confirmed by additional data in fourth inference.
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Figure 7. Minimum first inference information out of 1 million independent experiments. This particularly
rare case shows how first samples can mislead inference, which is later corrected by additional observations.
The fourth inference (right) bears remarkably little overlap with the first.
Figure 8. Maximum first inference information out of 1 million independent experiments. The true value
of θ has taken an extremely rare value. As evidence accumulates, plausible ranges of θ confirm the first
inference.
Figure 9. Inconsistent inference. The first 10 samples are drawn from a different ground truth than
subsequent samples, but inference proceeds as usual. As additional data become available, first inference
information becomes markedly negative.
Finally, we examine a scenario in which the first 10 samples are generated from a different process
than subsequent samples. We proceed with inference as before and assume a single generative process,
despite the fact that this assumption is actually false. Figure 9 shows the resulting inference sequence. After
first inference, nothing appears unusual because there is no data that would contradict inferred belief. As
soon as additional data become available, however, information in first inference becomes conspicuously
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negative. Note that the one-in-a-million genuine experiment exhibiting minimum information, Figure 7,
gives −11.53 bits after 70 additional samples. In contrast, this experiment yields −47.91 bits after only 10
additional samples.
By comparing this result to the information distribution in the realization limit, we see that the
probability of a genuine experiment exhibiting information this negative would be less than 2−155. This
shows how highly negative information may flag anomalous data. We explore this further in the next
section.
6.2. Negative information in MNIST model with mislabeled data
We also explore predictive label information in machine learning models by constructing a small
neural network to predict MNIST digits [5]. This model was trained with 50,000 images with genuine
labels. Training was halted using cross-validation from 10,000 images that also had genuine labels. To
investigate how predictive label information serves as an indicator of prediction accuracy, we randomly
mislabeled a fraction of unseen cases. Prediction information was observed on 10,000 images for which
50% had been randomly relabeled, which resulted in 5,521 original labels and 4,479 mismatched labels.
The resulting distribution of information outcomes is plotted in Figure 10, which shows a dramatic
difference between genuine labels and mislabeled cases. In all cases, prediction information is quantified
from the uninformed probabilities q0(y = yi) = 1/10 for all outcomes i ∈ [10] to model predictions, which
are conditioned on the image input q1(y | x), in the view of the label r(y | yi). Total label information, the
sum of predictive label information and residual label information, is
Ir(y | yi)[ r(y | yi) ‖ q0(y) ] = Ir(y | yi)[ q1(y | x) ‖ q0(y) ] + Ir(y | yi)[ r(y | yi) ‖ q1(y | x) ] = log2(10) bits
or roughly 3.32 bits for each case. Both Figure 11 and Figure 12 show different forms of anomaly detection
using negative information.
Figure 11 shows that genuine labels may exhibit negative information when predictions are poor.
Only 1.1% of correct cases exhibit negative predictive label information. The distribution mean is 3.2 bits
for this set. Notably, the first two images appear to be genuinely mislabeled in the original dataset, which
underscores the ability of this technique to detect anomalies.
In contrast, over 99.1% of mislabeled cases exhibit negative information with the distribution mean at
−18 bits. The top row of Figure 12 shows that information is most negative when the claimed label is not
Figure 10. Histogram of information outcomes for mismatched and original labels. Correct label
information is highly concentrated at 3.2 bits, which is 95.9% of the total information contained in labels.
Mislabeled cases have mean information at -18 bits and information is negative for 99.15% of mislabeled
cases.
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plausible and model predictions clearly match the image. Similarly to 6.1, strongly negative information
indicates anomalous data. When incorrect predictions match incorrect labels, however, information can be
positive as shown in the bottom row. The cases appear to share identifiable features with the claim.
Figure 11. Original MNIST labels. The top row shows lowest predictive label information among
original labels. Notably, the two leading images appear to be genuinely mislabeled in the original dataset.
Subsequent predictions are poor. The bottom row shows the highest information among original labels.
Labels and predictions are consistent in these cases.
Figure 12. Mislabeled digits. The top row shows the lowest predictive label information among mislabeled
cases. In each case, the claimed label is implausible and the prediction is correct. The bottom row shows
the highest prediction information among mislabeled cases. Although claimed labels are incorrect, most
images share identifiable features with the claim.
7. Conclusion
Just as belief matures with accumulation of evidence, we hold that the information associated with a
shift in belief must also mature. By formulating principles that articulate how we may regard information
as a reasonable expectation that measures change in belief, we derived a theory of information that
places existing measures of entropic information in a coherent unified framework. These measures
include Shannon’s original description of entropy, cross-entropy, realization information, Kullback-Leibler
divergence, and Lindley information (uncertainty difference) due to an experiment.
Moreover, we found other explainable information measures that may be adapted to specific scenarios
from first principles including the log pointwise predictive measure of model accuracy. We derived useful
properties of information including the chain rule of conditional dependence, additivity over belief updates,
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consistency with respect expected future observations, and expected information in future experiments
as mutual information. We also showed how this theory generalizes information-critical probability
distributions that are consistent with observed expectations analogous to that of Jaynes’. In the context
of Bayesian inference, we showed how information constraints recover and illuminate useful annealed
inference practices.
We also examined the phenomenon of negative information, which occurs when a more justified point
of view, based on a broader body of evidence, indicates that a previous change of belief was misleading.
Experiments demonstrated that negative information reveals anomalous cases of inference or anomalous
predictions in the context of machine learning.
The primary value of this theoretical framework is the consistent interpretation and corresponding
properties of information that guide how it may be assessed in a given context. The property of additivity
over belief updates within the present view allows us to partition information in a logically consistent
manner. For machine learning algorithms, we see that total information from the uninformed state
to a label-informed state is a constant that may be partitioned into the predicted component and the
residual component. This insight suggests new approaches to model training, which will be the subject of
continuing research.
7.1. Future work
The challenges we seek to address with this theory relate to real-world applications of inference and
machine learning. Although Bayesian inference provides a rigorous foundation for learning, poor choices
of prior or likelihood can lead to results that elude or contradict human intuition when analyzed after the
fact. This only becomes worse as the scale of learning problems increases, as in deep neural networks,
where human intuition cannot catch inconsistencies. Information provides a metric to quantify how well
a model is learning that may be useful when structuring learning problems. Some related challenges
include:
1. Controlling model complexity in machine learning to avoid memorization,
2. Evaluating the influence of different experiments and data points to identify outliers or poorly
supported inferences,
3. Understanding the impact of both model-structure and fidelity of variational approximations on
learnability.
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Appendix A. Proof of principal result
Lemma A1. Let g(·) : R+ 7→ R be a function such that g(x1x2) = g(x1) + g(x2) for all x1, x2 > 0. It follows
that g(x) = a log(x) where a is a constant.
Proofs of Lemma A1 given by Erdös [47], Fadeev [37], Rényi [24].
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Lemma A2. Let f (·, ·, ·) : R3+ 7→ R be a function such that f (r1r2, q1q2, p1 p2) = f (r1, q1, p1) + f (r2, q2, p2)
for all r1, q1, p1, r2, q2, p2 > 0. It follows that f (r, q, p) = log
(
rγqαpβ
)
.
Proof of Lemma A2. We begin by defining g1(x) ≡ f (x−1, x, x), g2(y) ≡ f (y, y−1, y), and g3(z) ≡
f (z, z, z−1). It follows that g1(x1x2) = g(x1) + g(x2). From Lemma A1, we have g1(x) = a log(x) for some
constant a. Similarly, g2(y) = b log(y) and g3(z) = c log(z) for constants b and c. We may now construct
positive quantities x =
√
qp, y =
√
pr, and z =
√
rq and observe f (r, q, p) = f (x−1yz, xy−1z, xyz−1) =
f (x−1, x, x) + f (y, y−1, y) + f (z, z, z−1) = g1(x) + g2(y) + g1(z). The desired result follows by identifying
constants α = (c + a)/2, β = (a + b)/2, and γ = (b + c)/2
Proof of Theorem 1. We proceed by combining Postulate 1 with Postulate 2, which gives
Ir(z)r(w)[ q1(z)q1(w) ‖ q0(z)q0(w) ]
=
∫
dz dw r(z)r(w) f (r(z)r(w), q1(z)q1(w), q0(z)q0(w))
= Ir(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] + Ir(w)[ q1(w) ‖ q0(w) ]
=
∫
dz r(z) f (r(z), q1(z), q0(z)) +
∫
dw r(w) f (r(w), q1(w), q0(w))
=
∫
dz dw r(z)r(w) [ f (r(z), q1(z), q0(z)) + f (r(w), q1(w), q0(w))] .
The last line follows by multiplying each term in the previous line by
∫
dw r(w) = 1 and
∫
dz r(z) = 1,
respectively. Since this must hold for arbitrary r(z)r(w), this implies
f (r(z)r(w), q1(z)q1(w), q0(z)q0(w)) = f (r(z), q1(z), q0(z)) + f (r(w), q1(w), q0(w)) .
By Lemma A2, we have f (r(z), q1(z), q0(z)) = log
(
r(z)γq1(z)αq0(z)β
)
. From Postulate 3, we require∫
dz r(z) log
(
r(z)γq0(z)α+β
)
= γ
∫
dz r(z) log r(z) + (α+ β)
∫
dz r(z) log q0(z) = 0.
Since this must hold for arbitrary r(z) and q0(z), this implies γ = 0 and β = −α. Thus we see that
Ir(z)[ r(z) ‖ q0(z) ] = αDKL[ r(z) ‖ q0(z) ], which is a constant α times the Kullback-Leibler divergence [6].
Jensen’s inequality easily shows nonnegativity of the form
∫
dz r(z) log
(
r(z)
q0(z)
)
= −
∫
dz r(z) log
(
q0(z)
r(z)
)
≥ − log
(∫
dz r(z)
q0(z)
r(z)
)
= − log(1) = 0.
It follows from Postulate 4 that α > 0. As Shannon notes, the scale is arbitrary and simply defines the unit
of measure.
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Appendix B. Corollary proofs
Proof of triangle inequality for Definition 2. To simplify notation, we use the following definitions
a(z) = log
(
q1(z)
q0(z)
)
, α = Lpr(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] =
(∫
dz r(z) |a(z)|p
)1/p
,
b(z) = log
(
q2(z)
q1(z)
)
, β = Lpr(z)[ q2(z) ‖ q1(z) ] =
(∫
dz r(z) |b(z)|p
)1/p
.
Applying homogeneity followed by Jensen’s inequality, we have
Lpr(z)[ q2(z) ‖ q0(z) ] =
(∫
dz r(z) |a(z) + b(z)|p
)1/p
= (α+ β)
(∫
dz r(z)
∣∣∣∣( αα+ β
)
a(z)
α
+
(
β
α+ β
)
b(z)
β
∣∣∣∣p)1/p
≤ (α+ β)
((
α
α+ β
)∫
dz r(z)
∣∣∣∣ a(z)α
∣∣∣∣p +( βα+ β
)∫
dz r(z)
∣∣∣∣ b(z)β
∣∣∣∣p)1/p
= (α+ β)
(
α
α+ β
+
β
α+ β
)1/p
= α+ β.
Proof of Corollary 1. We unpack Theorem 1 and write joint distributions as the marginalization times the
corresponding conditional distribution such as r(z1, z2) ≡ r(z2 | z1)r(z1). This gives
Ir(z1,z2)[ q1(z1, z2) ‖ q0(z1, z2) ]
=
∫
dz1 dz2 r(z1, z2) log
(
q1(z1, z2)
q0(z1, z2)
)
=
∫
dz1 r(z1)
∫
dz2 r(z2 | z1) log
(
q1(z1)q1(z2 | z1)
q0(z1)q0(z2 | z1)
)
=
∫
dz1 r(z1) log
(
q1(z1)
q0(z1)
)
+
∫
dz1 r(z1)
∫
dz2 r(z2 | z1) log
(
q1(z2 | z1)
q0(z2 | z1)
)
= Ir(z1)[ q1(z1) ‖ q0(z1) ] +Er(z1) Ir(z2 | z1)[ q1(z2 | z1) ‖ q0(z2 | z1) ] .
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Proof of Corollary 2. Again, we simply unpack Theorem 1 and apply the product property of the
logarithm as
Ir(z)[ q2(z) ‖ q0(z) ] =
∫
dz r(z) log
(
q2(z)
q0(z)
)
=
∫
dz r(z) log
(
q2(z)q1(z)
q1(z)q0(z)
)
=
∫
dz r(z) log
(
q2(z)
q1(z)
)
+
∫
dz r(z) log
(
q1(z)
q0(z)
)
= Ir(z)[ q2(z) ‖ q1(z) ] + Ir(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] .
Proof of Corollary 3. Swapping q0(z) and q1(z) reciprocates the argument of the logarithm in Theorem 1,
which gives the negative of the original ordering.
Proof of Corollary 4. After realization zˇ = zj, probability is distributed as r(z = zi | zj) = δij. Restricting
support to z = zˇ gives
Ir(z | zˇ)[ r(z | zˇ) ‖ q(z) ] = log
(
1
q(z = zˇ)
)
= D[ 1 ‖ q(z = zˇ) ] .
Proof of Corollary 5. Computing the expectation value as given easily reconstructs the standard
formulation of cross entropy
Sr(z)[ q(z) ] = Er(zˇ) Ir(z | zˇ)[ r(z | zˇ) ‖ q(z) ]
=
∫
dz r(z) log
(
1
q(z)
)
= Ir(z)[ 1 ‖ q(z) ] .
Proof of Corollary 6. This follows by simply replacing r(z) with q(z) in cross entropy.
Proof of Corollary 7. Plausible joint values of z and w are p(z,w) = p(z |w)p(w). Marginalizing over
w recovers present belief
∫
dw p(z |w)p(w) = p(z). It follows
Ep(w) Ip(z |w)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] =
∫
dw p(w)
∫
dz p(z |w) log
(
q1(z)
q0(z)
)
=
∫
dz p(z) log
(
q1(z)
q0(z)
)
= Ip(z)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] .
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Proof of Corollary 8. We compute the expectation value stated and simply rewrite the product of the
marginalization and conditional distribution as the joint distribution p(z |w)p(w) ≡ p(z,w). This gives
Ep(w) Ip(z |w)[ p(z |w) ‖ p(z) ]
=
∫
dw p(w)
∫
dz p(z |w) log
(
p(z |w)p(w)
p(w)p(z)
)
=
∫
dw dz p(z,w) log
(
p(z,w)
p(z)p(w)
)
= Ip(z,w)[ p(z,w) ‖ p(z)p(w) ] .
Proof of Corollary 9. The limit of increasing precision yields the Dirac delta function p(z | zˇ) ≡ δ(z− zˇ).
It follows
Ip(z | zˇ)[ q1(z) ‖ q0(z) ] =
∫
dz δ(z− zˇ) log
(
q1(z)
q0(z)
)
= log
(
q1(z = zˇ)
q0(z = zˇ)
)
.
Proof of Corollary 10. We consider differential variations at the optimizer q1(z) = q∗(z) + εη(z) where
variations η(z) must maintain normalization
∫
dz η(z) = 0 and are otherwise arbitrary. Taking the Gâteaux
derivative (with respect to the differential element ε) and applying the variational principle gives
0 =
∫
dz η(z)
[
p(z | x)
q∗(z)
]
.
To satisfy the normalization constraint for otherwise arbitrary η(z), the term in brackets must be constant.
The stated result immediately follows.
Proof of Corollary 11. Let measurable disjoint subsets of outcomes be Ω> = {z | r(z) > q1(z) > 0} and
Ω< = {z | r(z) < q1(z)}. If η(z) drives belief toward r(z) on all measurable subsets then η(z) ≥ 0
for z almost everywhere in Ω>. Likewise, η(z) ≤ 0 almost everywhere in Ω<. Finally, η(z) = 0
almost everywhere on the complement Ωz \ (Ω> ∪Ω<). In order to retain normalization, we note that∫
dz η(z) = 0. If information is finite, then we may express r(z) = q1(z)(1 + δ(z)) almost everywhere
(except an immeasurable subset that is not contained in Ω>∪Ω< for which we could have q1(z) = 0 and
r(z) > 0) and observe that δ(z) > 0 for z ∈ Ω> just as δ(z) < 0 for z ∈ Ω<. Since η(z) has the same sign
as δ(z) almost everywhere, it follows
lim
ε→0
∂
∂ε
Ir(z)[ q1(z) + εη(z) ‖ q0(z) ]
= lim
ε→0
∂
∂ε
∫
dz r(z) log
(
q1(z) + εη(z)
q0(z)
)
=
∫
dz r(z)
η(z)
q1(z)
=
∫
dz (1+ δ(z)) η(z)
=
∫
dz δ(z)η(z)
> 0.
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Proof of Corollary 12. We proceed by constructing the Lagrangian
L[ r(z),λ ] =
∫
dz r(z)
(
log
(
r(z)
q0(z)
)
−
n
∑
i=1
λi ( fi(z)− ϕi)
)
.
We consider differential variations at the optimizer r(z) = r∗(z) + εη(z) where variations η(z) must
maintain normalization
∫
dz η(z) = 0 and are otherwise arbitrary. Taking the Gâteaux derivative and
applying the variational principle gives
0 =
∫
dz η(z)
[
log
(
r∗(z)
q0(z)
)
+ 1−
n
∑
i=1
λi ( fi(z)− ϕi)
]
.
To satisfy the normalization constraint for otherwise arbitrary η(z), the variational principle requires the
term in brackets to be constant. The stated result immediately follows.
Proof of Corollary 13. We unpack Theorem 1 and apply the local conditionality property to write
p(θ1, θ2 | yˇ) ≡ p(θ2 | θ1)p(θ1 | yˇ). This gives
Ip(θ1,θ2 | yˇ)[ p(θ1, θ2 | yˇ) ‖ p(θ1, θ2) ]
=
∫
dθ1 dθ2 p(θ1, θ2 | yˇ) log
(
p(θ1, θ2 | yˇ)
p(θ1, θ2)
)
=
∫
dθ2 p(θ2 | θ1)
∫
dθ1 p(θ1 | yˇ) log
(
p(θ2 | θ1)p(θ1 | yˇ)
p(θ2 | θ1)p(θ1)
)
=
∫
dθ1 p(θ1 | yˇ) log
(
p(θ1 | yˇ)
p(θ1)
)
= Ip(θ1 | yˇ)[ p(θ1 | yˇ) ‖ p(θ1) ] .
Proof of Corollary 14. As a consequence of local conditional dependence, we observe that p(θ2 | yˇ) =∫
dθ1 p(θ2 | θ1)p(θ1 | yˇ). Then we apply Jensen’s inequality followed by Bayes’ Theorem to obtain
Ip(θ2 | yˇ)[ p(θ2 | yˇ) ‖ p(θ2) ]
=
∫
dθ2
[∫
dθ1 p(θ2 | θ1)p(θ1 | yˇ)
]
log
(
p(θ2 | yˇ)
p(θ2)
)
≤
∫
dθ1 p(θ1 | yˇ) log
(∫
dθ2 p(θ2 | θ1)p(θ2 | yˇ)p(θ2)
)
=
∫
dθ1 p(θ1 | yˇ) log
(∫
dθ2
p(θ1 | θ2)p(θ2 | yˇ)
p(θ1)
)
=
∫
dθ1 p(θ1 | yˇ)
[
log
(
p(θ1 | yˇ)
p(θ1)
)
+ log
(∫
dθ2
p(θ1 | θ2)p(θ2 | yˇ)
p(θ1 | yˇ)
)]
.
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The first term provides the upper bound we seek. It remains to show that the second term is bound from
above by zero, which follows from a second application of Jensen’s inequality
Ip(θ2 | yˇ)[ p(θ2 | yˇ) ‖ p(θ2) ]
≤ Ip(θ1 | yˇ)[ p(θ1 | yˇ) ‖ p(θ1) ] + log
(∫
dθ1 dθ2 p(θ1 | θ2)p(θ2 | yˇ)
)
= Ip(θ1 | yˇ)[ p(θ1 | yˇ) ‖ p(θ1) ] .
Proof of Corollary 15. The denominator of the first log argument is model evidence and we apply Bayes’
Theorem to the second log argument. Denominators of log arguments cancel and Jensen’s inequality
implies that the first term must be greater than the second.
Ir(y | yˇ)[ q(y | yˇ) ‖ p(y) ]− Ip(θ | yˇ)[ p(θ | yˇ) ‖ p(θ) ]
=
∫
dy δ(y− yˇ) log
(∫
dθp(y | θ)p(θ | yˇ)∫
dθp(y | θ)p(θ)
)
−
∫
dθp(θ | yˇ) log
(
p(θ | yˇ)
p(θ)
)
= log
(∫
dθp(yˇ | θ)p(θ | yˇ)
p(yˇ)
)
−
∫
dθp(θ | yˇ) log
(
p(yˇ | θ)
p(yˇ)
)
= log
(∫
dθp(yˇ | θ)p(θ | yˇ)
)
−
∫
dθp(θ | yˇ) log(p(yˇ | θ)) ≥ 0.
Proof of Corollary 16. The stated result immediately follows by taking fi(θ) ≡ log
(
qi(θ)
q0(θ)
)
and applying
Corollary 12.
Proof of Corollary 17. We take n = 1, q0(θ) ≡ p(θ), and q1(θ) ≡ p(θ | yˇ) and apply Corollary 16 with
Bayes’ theorem to obtain
r(θ) ∝ p(θ)
(
p(θ | yˇ)
p(θ)
)λ
= p(θ)
(
p(yˇ | θ)
p(yˇ)
)λ
.
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Appendix C. Information computations in experiment
Appendix C.1. Inference
Prior belief is p(θ) ≡ N (θ | 0, A) and p(x(j)) ≡ N (x(j) | 0,Σ). Since y(j) = θ+ x(j), we have
p(y(j) | θ) ≡ N (y(j) | θ,Σ). If we let n samples have an average y¯, it easily follows that p(y¯ | θ) ≡
N (y¯ | θ, 1nΣ). Bayes’ rule gives p(θ | y¯) ∝ p(y¯ | θ)p(θ) or
p(θ | y¯) ∝ exp
[−1
2
θTA θ− n
2
(θ− y¯)TΣ (θ− y¯)
]
∝ exp
[−1
2
(θ− µ)TB (θ− µ)
]
where B = A + nΣ and µ = nBΣ y¯. Normalization yields p(θ | y¯) ≡ N (θ | µ,B).
Appendix C.2. Mutual information
We marginalize over plausible θ to obtain corresponding probability of observing y¯ as p(y¯) =∫
dθp(θ)p(y¯ | θ). This gives p(y¯) ≡ N (y¯ | 0, A + 1nΣ). Mutual information, which is the expected
information gained by observing y¯ according to present belief, is computed
∫
dy¯ dθp(y¯, θ) log
(
p(y¯, θ)
p(y¯)p(θ)
)
=
∫
dθp(θ)
∫
dy¯ p(y¯ | θ) log
(
p(y¯ | θ)
p(y¯)
)
=
∫
dθp(θ)
∫
dy¯ p(y¯ | θ) log

∣∣∣2pi 1nΣ∣∣∣−1/2 exp(−n2 (y¯− θ)TΣ (y¯− θ))∣∣∣2pi(A+ 1nΣ)∣∣∣−1/2 exp(−12 y¯T(A+ 1nΣ)−1y¯)

=
1
2
log det(nΣ A+ I)
Appendix C.3. First inference information in a subsequent view
Let the state of belief before an experiment be p(θ) ≡ N (θ | 0, A). After observing y¯(1) inference gives
p(θ | y¯(1)) ≡ N (θ | µ,B). Additional observations y¯(2) yield p(θ | y¯(1), y¯(2)) ≡ N (θ | ν,C). Information
gained in the first observation in the view of inference following the second observation is computed
Ip(θ | y¯(1),y¯(2))
[
p(θ | y¯(1))
∥∥∥ p(θ) ]
=
∫
dθN (θ | ν,C) log
 |2piB|−1/2 exp
(
−1
2 (θ− µ)TB (θ− µ)
)
|2piA|−1/2 exp
(
−1
2 θ
TA θ
)

=
1
2
(
log det(AB ) + tr((A − B )C) + νTA ν− (ν− µ)TB (ν− µ)
)
.
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